Accepted Papers
Haris Aziz.
Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness
Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer.
Decision Scoring Rules
Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias and Benjamin Plaut.
Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Markets
Benjamin Plaut.
Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation
Ashish Goel and Benjamin Plaut.
Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pricing
Ross Rheingans-Yoo.
Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores
Vittorio Bilò, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli and Cosimo Vinci.
Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing
Paul Goldberg, Edwin Lock and Francisco Javier Marmolejo Cossio.
Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries
Cong Chen and Yinfeng Xu.
The curse of rationality in sequential scheduling games
Tony Ke and K Sudhir.
Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Driven Markets
Ben Berger, Alon Eden and Michal Feldman.
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets
Itay Kavaler and Rann Smorodinsky.
A Cardinal Comparison of Experts
Stefanos Leonardos, Iosif Sakos, Georgios Piliouras and Costas Courcoubetis.
Catastrophe by Design in Population Games: Destabilizing Wasteful Locked-in Technologies
Ron Kupfer.
The Influence of One Strategic Agent on the Core of Stable Matchings
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis.
Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information
Paul Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi and Warut Suksompong.
Consensus Halving for Sets of Items
Mete Şeref Ahunbay and Adrian Vetta.
The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions
Devansh Jalota, Qi Qi, Marco Pavone and Yinyu Ye.
Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing
Cong Chen, Paul Giessler, Akaki Mamageishvili, Matus Mihalak and Paolo Penna.
Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling Games
Tao Jiang, Young-San Lin and Thanh Nguyen.
Market Equilibrium in Multi-tier Supply Chain Networks
Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala.
Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Non-atomic Routing Games
Akaki Mamageishvili and Oriol Tejada.
How Many Citizens Have Already Voted? The Role of (Interim) Turnout Rate Polls in Elections
Vincent Conitzer, Yuan Deng and Shaddin Dughmi.
Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games
Max Bender, Jacob Gilbert, Aditya Krishnan and Kirk Pruhs.
Competitively Pricing Parking in a Tree
Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi and Alexander Skopalik.
Improving approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games
Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer.
Minimum-regret contracts for principal-expert problems
Lukas Graf and Tobias Harks.
The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equilibria
Hanrui Zhang.
A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions
Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar and Nisarg Shah.
Optimal Bounds on the Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods
Daniel Halpern, Ariel Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas and Nisarg Shah.
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All
Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy, Itai Ashlagi, Rahul Makhijani, Daniela Saban and Kirankumar Shiragur.
Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets
Will Ma.
Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Auctions for Multiple Buyers with Ordinal Preferences over Fixed-price Items
Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier and Neil Newman.
Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates
Aditya Saraf, Anna Karlin and Jamie Morgenstern.
Competition Alleviates Present Bias in Task Completion
Marco Pavone, Amin Saberi, Maximilian Schiffer and Matthew Tsao.
Online Hypergraph Matching with Delays
Niclas Boehmer and Klaus Heeger.
A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas
Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu.
Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question
Francisco Benita, Vittorio Bilò, Barnabé Monnot, Georgios Piliouras and Cosimo Vinci.
Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology
Jad Salem and Swati Gupta.
Closing the Gap: Mitigating Bias in Online Resume-Filtering
Makis Arsenis, Odysseas Drosis and Robert Kleinberg.
Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julian Mestre, Okke Schrijvers and Chris Wilkens.
The Ad Types Problem
Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Dušan Knop and Rolf Niedermeier.
Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List