2020: The 16th Conference on Web and Internet Economics

December 7-11, 2020, Peking University, Beijing


Accepted Papers

Haris Aziz.

Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness

Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer.

Decision Scoring Rules

Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias and Benjamin Plaut.

Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Markets

Benjamin Plaut.

Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation

Ashish Goel and Benjamin Plaut.

Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pricing

Ross Rheingans-Yoo.

Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores

Vittorio Bilò, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli and Cosimo Vinci.

Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing

Paul Goldberg, Edwin Lock and Francisco Javier Marmolejo Cossio.

Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries

Cong Chen and Yinfeng Xu.

The curse of rationality in sequential scheduling games

Tony Ke and K Sudhir.

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Driven Markets

Ben Berger, Alon Eden and Michal Feldman.

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets

Itay Kavaler and Rann Smorodinsky.

A Cardinal Comparison of Experts

Stefanos Leonardos, Iosif Sakos, Georgios Piliouras and Costas Courcoubetis.

Catastrophe by Design in Population Games: Destabilizing Wasteful Locked-in Technologies

Ron Kupfer.

The Influence of One Strategic Agent on the Core of Stable Matchings

Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis.

Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information

Paul Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi and Warut Suksompong.

Consensus Halving for Sets of Items

Mete Şeref Ahunbay and Adrian Vetta.

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

Devansh Jalota, Qi Qi, Marco Pavone and Yinyu Ye.

Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing

Cong Chen, Paul Giessler, Akaki Mamageishvili, Matus Mihalak and Paolo Penna.

Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling Games

Tao Jiang, Young-San Lin and Thanh Nguyen.

Market Equilibrium in Multi-tier Supply Chain Networks

Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala.

Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Non-atomic Routing Games

Akaki Mamageishvili and Oriol Tejada.

How Many Citizens Have Already Voted? The Role of (Interim) Turnout Rate Polls in Elections

Vincent Conitzer, Yuan Deng and Shaddin Dughmi.

Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games

Max Bender, Jacob Gilbert, Aditya Krishnan and Kirk Pruhs.

Competitively Pricing Parking in a Tree

Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi and Alexander Skopalik.

Improving approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games

Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer.

Minimum-regret contracts for principal-expert problems

Lukas Graf and Tobias Harks.

The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equilibria

Hanrui Zhang.

A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions

Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar and Nisarg Shah.

Settling the Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods

Daniel Halpern, Ariel Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas and Nisarg Shah.

Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All

Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy, Itai Ashlagi, Rahul Makhijani, Daniela Saban and Kirankumar Shiragur.

Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets

Will Ma.

Revenue-Maximizing Auctions when Buyers have Ordinal Preferences for Fixed-price Items

Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier and Neil Newman.

Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates

Aditya Saraf, Anna Karlin and Jamie Morgenstern.

Competition Alleviates Present Bias in Task Completion

Marco Pavone, Amin Saberi, Maximilian Schiffer and Matthew Tsao.

Online Hypergraph Matching with Delays

Niclas Boehmer and Klaus Heeger.

A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas

Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu.

Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question

Francisco Benita, Vittorio Bilò, Barnabé Monnot, Georgios Piliouras and Cosimo Vinci.

Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology

Jad Salem and Swati Gupta.

Closing the Gap: Mitigating Bias in Online Resume-Filtering

Makis Arsenis, Odysseas Drosis and Robert Kleinberg.

Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders

Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julian Mestre, Okke Schrijvers and Chris Wilkens.

The Ad Types Problem

Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Dušan Knop and Rolf Niedermeier.

Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List