2020: The 16th Conference on Web and Internet Economics

December 7-11, 2020, Peking University, Beijing

 

Accepted Papers


Haris Aziz.

Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness


Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer.

Decision Scoring Rules


Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias and Benjamin Plaut.

Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Markets


Benjamin Plaut.

Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation


Ashish Goel and Benjamin Plaut.

Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pricing


Ross Rheingans-Yoo.

Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores


Vittorio Bilò, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli and Cosimo Vinci.

Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing


Paul Goldberg, Edwin Lock and Francisco Javier Marmolejo Cossio.

Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries


Cong Chen and Yinfeng Xu.

The curse of rationality in sequential scheduling games


Tony Ke and K Sudhir.

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Driven Markets


Ben Berger, Alon Eden and Michal Feldman.

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets


Itay Kavaler and Rann Smorodinsky.

A Cardinal Comparison of Experts


Stefanos Leonardos, Iosif Sakos, Georgios Piliouras and Costas Courcoubetis.

Catastrophe by Design in Population Games: Destabilizing Wasteful Locked-in Technologies


Ron Kupfer.

The Influence of One Strategic Agent on the Core of Stable Matchings


Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis.

Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information


Paul Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi and Warut Suksompong.

Consensus Halving for Sets of Items


Mete Şeref Ahunbay and Adrian Vetta.

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions


Devansh Jalota, Qi Qi, Marco Pavone and Yinyu Ye.

Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing


Cong Chen, Paul Giessler, Akaki Mamageishvili, Matus Mihalak and Paolo Penna.

Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling Games


Tao Jiang, Young-San Lin and Thanh Nguyen.

Market Equilibrium in Multi-tier Supply Chain Networks


Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala.

Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Non-atomic Routing Games


Akaki Mamageishvili and Oriol Tejada.

How Many Citizens Have Already Voted? The Role of (Interim) Turnout Rate Polls in Elections


Vincent Conitzer, Yuan Deng and Shaddin Dughmi.

Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games


Max Bender, Jacob Gilbert, Aditya Krishnan and Kirk Pruhs.

Competitively Pricing Parking in a Tree


Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi and Alexander Skopalik.

Improving approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games


Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer.

Minimum-regret contracts for principal-expert problems


Lukas Graf and Tobias Harks.

The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equilibria


Hanrui Zhang.

A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions


Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar and Nisarg Shah.

Settling the Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods


Daniel Halpern, Ariel Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas and Nisarg Shah.

Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All


Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy, Itai Ashlagi, Rahul Makhijani, Daniela Saban and Kirankumar Shiragur.

Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets


Will Ma.

Revenue-Maximizing Auctions when Buyers have Ordinal Preferences for Fixed-price Items


Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier and Neil Newman.

Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates


Aditya Saraf, Anna Karlin and Jamie Morgenstern.

Competition Alleviates Present Bias in Task Completion


Marco Pavone, Amin Saberi, Maximilian Schiffer and Matthew Tsao.

Online Hypergraph Matching with Delays


Niclas Boehmer and Klaus Heeger.

A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas


Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu.

Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question


Francisco Benita, Vittorio Bilò, Barnabé Monnot, Georgios Piliouras and Cosimo Vinci.

Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology


Jad Salem and Swati Gupta.

Closing the Gap: Mitigating Bias in Online Resume-Filtering


Makis Arsenis, Odysseas Drosis and Robert Kleinberg.

Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders


Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julian Mestre, Okke Schrijvers and Chris Wilkens.

The Ad Types Problem


Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Dušan Knop and Rolf Niedermeier.

Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List