Conference Program

WINE 2020 Best Paper

A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas

Eliciting Information by Information Theory - Yuqing Kong

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets

Ben Berger, Alon Eden and Michal Feldman

Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis

17:30-17:55

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions
Mete Şeref Ahunbay and Adrian Vetta

Competitively Pricing Parking in a Tree
Max Bender, Jacob Gilbert, Aditya Krishnan and Kirk Pruhs

Decision Scoring Rules
Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer

A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions
Hanrui Zhang

Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Auctions for Multiple Buyers with Ordinal Preferences over Fixed-price Items
Will Ma

Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question
Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu

Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders
Makis Arsenis, Odysseas Drosis and Robert Kleinberg

How Many Citizens Have Already Voted? The Role of (Interim) Turnout Rate Polls in Elections
Akaki Mamageishvili and Oriol Tejada

Keynote Speech - Yiling Chen
Challenges of Incorporating Algorithms into Decision Making: Fairness, Welfare and Disparate Interactions

Session: Matching (16:00-19:55)

Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Markets
Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias and Benjamin Plaut

The Ad Types Problem
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julian Mestre, Okke Schrijvers and Chris Wilkens

Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List
Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Dušan Knop and Rolf Niedermeier

Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates
Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier and Neil Newman

Online Hypergraph Matching with Delays
Marco Pavone, Amin Saberi, Maximilian Schiffer and Matthew Tsao

Large Random Matching Markets with Localized Preference Structures Can Exhibit Large Cores
Ross Rheingans-Yoo

The Influence of One Strategic Agent on the Core of Stable Matchings
Ron Kupfer

Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets
Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy, Itai Ashlagi, Rahul Makhijani, Daniela Saban and Kirankumar Shiragur

Poster Session

Click here to view the accepted posters

Keynote Speech - Constantinos Daskalakis
Equilibrium Computation and the Foundations of Deep Learning

Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pricing
Ashish Goel and Benjamin Plaut

Market Equilibrium in Multi-tier Supply Chain Networks
Tao Jiang, Young-San Lin and Thanh Nguyen

Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation
Benjamin Plaut

Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing
Devansh Jalota, Qi Qi, Marco Pavone and Yinyu Ye

A Cardinal Comparison of Experts
Itay Kavaler and Rann Smorodinsky

Catastrophe by Design in Population Games: Destabilizing Wasteful Locked-in Technologies
Stefanos Leonardos, Iosif Sakos, Georgios Piliouras and Costas Courcoubetis

Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries
Paul Goldberg, Edwin Lock and Francisco Javier Marmolejo Cossio

Minimum-Regret Contracts for Principal-Expert Problems
Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Driven Markets
Tony Ke and K Sudhir

Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness
Haris Aziz

Consensus Halving for Sets of Items
Paul Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi and Warut Suksompong

Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All
Daniel Halpern, Ariel Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas and Nisarg Shah

Optimal Bounds on the Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods
Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar and Nisarg Shah

Closing the Gap: Mitigating Bias in Online Resume-Filtering
Jad Salem and Swati Gupta

Keynote Speech - Jose Correa
Optimal stopping from sampled data

Sponsor Speech - Zizhuo Wang
Aggregation Bias in Estimating Price Elasticity

Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing
Vittorio Bilò, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli and Cosimo Vinci

Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology
Francisco Benita, Vittorio Bilò, Barnabé Monnot, Georgios Piliouras and Cosimo Vinci

Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling Games
Cong Chen, Paul Giessler, Akaki Mamageishvili, Matus Mihalak and Paolo Penna

Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Non-atomic Routing Games
Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala

The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equilibria
Lukas Graf and Tobias Harks

Competition Alleviates Present Bias in Task Completion
Aditya Saraf, Anna Karlin and Jamie Morgenstern

The Curse of Rationality in Sequential Scheduling Games
Cong Chen and Yinfeng Xu

Improving Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games
Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi and Alexander Skopalik

Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games
Vincent Conitzer, Yuan Deng and Shaddin Dughmi

EC'20 Best Presentation - Kira Goldner

Keynote Speech - Eric Budish
The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain

Workshop on Blockchain

Click here for the program details