2020: The 16th Conference on Web and Internet Economics

December 7-11, 2020, Peking University, Beijing


Women in EconCS

Yukun Cheng

Speaker: Yukun Cheng, Suzhou University of Science and Technology

Title: Incentive Study on Strategic Behaviors to BitTorrent Resource Sharing System

Abstract:In this talk, our incentive study has focused on the well-known BitTorrent network which has, arguably, been the first successful Internet-scale resource sharing system. Early works have modeled its tit-for-tat strategy as a proportional response protocol, and shown that the dynamics of such a protocol converges to a market equilibrium. We first develop an array of truthfulness results of the proportional response protocol against different deviations in the forms of the weight cheating strategy and edge deleting strategy. However, it is shown that the proportional response protocol is not truthful against the Sybil attack where an agent may split its resource among its different copies. As a remedy for this untruthful property under the Sybil attack, the incentive of any agent has been shown to generate a limited gain for an agent pursuing such an attack under several special networks, which can be characterized by incentive ratio. We have conducted a series of works on the incentive ratio of proportional response protocol against the Sybil attack on different kinds of networks. In this talk, I will introduce our aforementioned works of the incentive analysis on agents’ strategic behaviors to BitTorrent Resource Sharing in the past five years.

Short Bio:

Dr. Yukun Cheng is a professor in Suzhou University of Science and Technology. She worked as a postdoc in the college of Computer Science and Technology at Zhejiang University from 2010 to 2013, and received her Ph. D. degree in the Department of Science at Shanghai University in 2010. Her research interest includes the economics of information, algorithmic game theory, combinatorial optimization and blockchain.

Yuqing Kong

Speaker: Yuqing Kong, Peking University

Title: Eliciting Information by Information Theory

Abstract:This talk will talk about how to employ information theory to design information elicitation mechanisms, evaluate elicited information, especially when the information cannot be verified. This talk will first give a conceptual idea about how to distill the challenge of information elicitation to the design of information measures. Then this talk will present several examples to show how to employ this conceptual idea to design information elicitation mechanism in varies of settings.

Short Bio:

Yuqing Kong is currently an assistant professor at the Center on Frontiers of Computing Studies (CFCS), Peking University. She obtained her Ph.D. degree from the Computer Science and Engineering Department at University of Michigan in 2018 and her bachelor degree in mathematics from University of Science and Technology of China in 2013. Her research interests lie in the intersection of theoretical computer science and the areas of economics: information elicitation, prediction markets, mechanism design, and the future applications of these areas to crowdsourcing and machine learning. Her papers were published in several conferences and journals include WINE, ITCS, EC, AAAI, ICLRNeurIPS, SODA, TEAC.

Lingfang (Ivy) Li

Speaker: Lingfang (Ivy) Li, Fudan University

Title: Restricted Mobility or Anxiety in COVID-19 pandemics: Evidence from E-commerce in China

Abstract:The global deterioration of COVID-19 on the traditional commercial has been immense. But little is known about its effects one-commerce. We quantify the causal effect of the lockdown for COVID-19 across continents on the online economy. Using the daily online data on imported baby formula across 75 brands from 19 countries and regions, we exploit a set of regression discontinuity (RD) estimation to document such causal effects. By exploiting the variation in timing of lockdown (breakout), we separate out two driving determinants associated with lockdown: limited human mobility and increased information anxiety. We find that on average, the daily transaction drops by 6.17 and price drops by 5.19 Yuan (CNY) due to limited human mobility. The similar magnitude of transaction and prices declines has been found due to increased information anxiety. Finally, we further exploit the mechanisms for the limited human mobility.

Short Bio:

Lingfang (Ivy) Li is a Professor of Economics in School of Management, Fudan University. She received her Ph. D. in Economics at University of California, Irvine2007. She worked as an Economics Assistant Professor in College of Business, University of Louisville 2007-2009. She also worked as an associate professor and the Director of Center for Mechanism design and Information Economics in Shanghai University Finance and Economics(2009-2014). Her research fields include information economics, industrial organization, applied game theory, and behavioral economics. Her research interest is in solving market design problems in the field of online markets by using both economic modeling and behavioral economics. In recent years, she has developed novel mechanisms to solve asymmetric information problems in online commerce market and also the Internet finance market. Her papers have been published in Management Science, Rand Journal of Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Decision Support Systems, Decision Science, etc. She currently serves as an associate editor for Decision Support Systems and be a Huoshui scholar for Alibaba group for several years. She has been rewarded “Pujiang Scholar,” “Shuguang Scholar” and Excellent Young Scholarship of Chinese National Science Foundation.

Tracy Xiao Liu

Speaker: Tracy Xiao Liu, Tsinghua University

Title: Gift Contagion in Online Groups: Evidence from WeChat Red Packets

Abstract:Gifts are important instruments to bond interpersonal relationships. Using 36 million online red packets on WeChat, we employ a natural experiment approach to identify in-group contagion of gift giving. We find that, on average, receiving one more dollar causes a recipient to send 18 cents back to the group within the subsequent 24 hours. Moreover, this effect is much stronger for "luckiest draw'' recipients, which suggests a group norm for gift giving. Additionally, we find that gift contagion is affected by in-group friendship network properties, such as the number of in-group friends and the local clustering coefficient.

Short Bio:

Tracy Xiao Liu is an associate professor in economics at Tsinghua University, School of Economics and Management. Her research interests are experimental economics, behavioral economics and online market design. She has published in both economics’ journals such as Games and Economic Behavior and Management Science, as well as conference proceedings in computer science such as KDD and AAAI.

Qi Qi

Speaker: Qi Qi, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Title: Multi-objective Mechanism Design for Public Good Allocation

Abstract:Different from conventional resource allocation problem settings, where resource holder has only single objective to maximize, efficiency, fairness, implementability and applicants’ satisfaction are all important criteria when allocating public resources for improving livelihoods. In this talk, we will discuss multi-objective mechanism design for three different real applications: vehicle licenses allocation, public housing allocation, and more recently public good allocation with social distancing in the Covid-19 pandemic. We take players’ strategic behaviours into consideration, and propose three different optimal and implementable mechanisms that could balance these criteria for these practical problems. We will also discuss possible applications of our results to resource allocation in other settings.

Short Bio:

Qi Qi is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Industrial Engineering and Decision Analytics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. She obtained her Ph.D. degree from the Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University under guidance of Professor Yinyu Ye. Her research interests lie generally in the areas of game theory and operations research, specifically mechanism and auction design, revenue and social welfare optimization, equilibrium computation and their applications in e-commerce, internet advertising, resource allocation and sharing economy. Her publications have appeared in Operations Research, Mathematics of Operations Research, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, Algorithmic and conferences including STOC, IJCAI, NeurIPS, WINE, SAGT, etc.

Nidhi Rathi

Speaker: Nidhi Rathi, Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore

Title: Fair Cake Division under Monotone Likelihood Ratios

Abstract:The cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing fair allocation of a divisible resource (metaphorically, the cake) among agents with distinct preferences. Classic results of Stromquist (1980) and Su (1999) show that envy- free (fair) cake divisions are guaranteed to exist under mild conditions. These strong existential results essentially follow from fixed-point theorems and stand without an algorithmic counterpart; Stromquist (2008) has shown that an envy-free cake division with contiguous pieces cannot be computed in bounded time. In this talk I will present a result which complements these existential (and non- constructive) guarantees by way of developing efficient cake-cutting algorithms for a broad class of valuations. In particular, our algorithmic result holds when the agents' valuations are induced by linear translations of any log-concave function, such as Gaussian, exponential, linear, or binomial. Joint work with Siddharth Barman. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.00481

Short Bio:

Nidhi Rathi is a final-year graduate student at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore, where she is working with Siddharth Barman (Dept. of Computer Science & Automation) and Mrinal K. Ghosh (Dept. of Mathematics). She is a recipient of the prestigious IBM Ph.D. Fellowship award. Her research interests include computational social choice, algorithmic game theory and optimization. Currently, she is working on the computational aspects of fair and efficient resource allocation problems. Her publications have appeared in conferences proceedings of SODA, EC, WINE, and AAAI.